It is well-known that von Neumann entropy is nonmonotonic unlike Shannon entropy (which is monotonically nondecreasing). Consequently, it is difficult to relate the entropies of the subsystems of a given quantum state. In this paper, we show that if we consider quantum secret sharing states arising from a class of monotone span programs, then we can partially recover the monotonicity of entropy for the so-called unauthorized sets. Furthermore, we can show for these quantum states the entropy of the authorized sets is monotonically nonincreasing.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we are motivated by the fact that one of the reasons why von Neumann entropy behaves differently from the Shannon entropy is rooted in its nonmonotonicity. A consequence of this fact is that many results and techniques of classical information theory do not smoothly generalize; one has to frequently overcome the obstacles imposed by the breakdown of monotonicity, often manifesting in various disguises. In classical secret sharing, one makes extensive use of information theoretic inequalities to bound the performance of secret sharing schemes, see [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] . In most cases these techniques do not appear to carry over to quantum secret sharing schemes, at least not easily. Quantum secret sharing has grown rapidly since its inception in [7] . Despite the growing body of literature on quantum secret sharing, see for instance [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] and the references therein, only a few of them, most notably [13, 14] , have succeeded in employing information theoretic methods for quantum secret sharing.
This paper attempts to contribute along this direction by studying the von Neumann entropy of subsets of a given quantum state. Of course, for an arbitrary quantum state we cannot expect a relation similar to the Shannon entropy. However, by imposing some restrictions on the quantum states, namely by considering a class of quantum secret sharing states, we are able to prove something definite.
Our main result is that if we consider a class of secret sharing quantum states, then we can prove that the von Neumann entropy is monotonically nondecreasing for certain subsystems of the quantum state, namely the unauthorized sets. The secret sharing states that we consider in this correspondence are those arising from a realization of the quantum secret sharing scheme via monotone span programs in a "normal form". We also show that for the subsystems that are authorized, the entropy is monotonically nonincreasing. * pradeep@phas.ubc.ca
II. BACKGROUND
Before presenting our main result, we review briefly the relevant background. In this paper a quantum secret sharing scheme refers to a protocol to distribute an unknown quantum state to a group of n players so that only authorized subsets of players can reconstruct the secret quantum state [7] [8] [9] . The state received by any participant is called a share. The set of players is denoted as P = {1, 2, . . . , n}. The collection of authorized sets, denoted as Γ, is called the access structure and the collection of unauthorized sets, denoted A, is called the adversary structure. The dual access structure is defined as
An access structure Γ can be realized by a quantum secret sharing scheme if and only if it satisfies Γ ⊆ Γ * , see [9, 10] . An access structure is said to be self-dual if Γ = Γ * . A self-dual access structure can be realized as quantum secret sharing scheme so that pure states are encoded as pure states; the associated secret sharing scheme is said to be a pure-state scheme. If Γ Γ * , then the associated secret sharing scheme encodes some pure state into a mixed state; such schemes are called mixed-state schemes.
An authorized set is said to be minimal if every proper subset of it is unauthorized. Minimal authorized sets completely characterize an access structure and we denote the collection of minimal authorized sets of Γ by Γ min .
A secret sharing scheme is said to be connected if every participant occurs in some minimal authorized set. A participant who does not occur in any minimal authorized set is said to be unimportant and the share associated to that player can be discarded without loss. We can assume that the access structure is defined on the reduced set of players excluding the unimportant players. In this paper we consider only connected secret sharing schemes, in other words, every player is important.
Closely related to this idea of important share is the notion of dispensable components of a share [15] . Suppose a part of the share received by a player does not play a role in the reconstruction of the secret in any of the minimal authorized sets to which the player belongs, then that part of the share can be discarded without any loss. We call such parts of the share dispensable components and indispensable otherwise. One way to create such components is to distribute additional quantum states that are unrelated to the secret. Such components neither aid nor hinder a subset's ability to reconstruct the secret. The access structure realized by the scheme is unaffected if such components of the share are discarded. We assume that the secret sharing schemes considered in this paper are devoid of such dispensable components in any share.
Definition 1 (CSS secret sharing schemes).
A pure-state secret sharing scheme Σ is said to be a CSS secret sharing scheme if the encoding for the scheme is of the form
where s ∈ F q and X ∈ F n q . A mixed-state secret scheme is said to be CSS type if it can be obtained by discarding one share of a pure-state CSS scheme.
As mixed-state schemes can be obtained from purestate schemes, see [9] , without loss of generality we can focus our attention on pure-state schemes. In terms of access structures this implies we can focus on the selfdual access structures.
Smith proposed a method to realize a quantum secret sharing scheme for any quantum access structure using monotone span programs. We will need parts of that construction to prove our result and therefore provide a quick review of the same. Further details can be found in [10] .
over F q and surjective function ψ : {1, 2, . . . , d} → P . The program is said to accept A ⊆ P if and only if
where M A is the submatrix of M and consists of all the rows that correspond to the participants in A.
We say M is the span matrix of the span program. A monotone span program is said to compute an access structure Γ if M accepts A ∈ Γ and rejects A ∈ Γ. It follows that for any unauthorized set B ⊆ P , we must have ε 1 ∈ Im(M t B ). Alternatively, there exists some v = (v 1 , . . . , v e ) ∈ F e q such that M B v = 0 and v 1 = 0. For every access structure Γ, we can realize it using a monotone span program in a "normal form". This is not necessarily efficient but these realizations provide us with the secret sharing states which are central for our discussion. We caution the reader that our terminology of span programs, especially the usage of normal form for monotone span programs, does not follow the standard terminology in the literature on span programs. (1, 0, . . . , 0, −1, 0, . . . , 0) is labeled by the last participant of
. . .
Classically this matrix defines the encoding for the secret sharing scheme. The scheme implicitly assumes an ordering of the participants and the use of c random variables in addition to the secret. For each minimal authorized set A i , the scheme distributes s i,1 , s i,2 . . . , s i,ri and s− j s i,j , where s i,j for 1 ≤ j ≤ r i are random variables. More precisely, s i,j is distributed to the jth player of A i for 1 ≤ j ≤ r i and s − j s i,j to the last player in A i . Considering the distribution scheme for the entire set of players we distribute uM t , where u = (s, s 1 , . . . , s c ). In the normal form construction, no player is unimportant and no share has a dispensable component.
We make the following useful observations about the structure of M as given in equation (4) .
i) The rows associated to the players in any authorized set are linearly independent. ii) The rank of M is given by 1 + r 1 + · · · + r k .
iii) The rows associated with any given participant are linearly independent. iv) For each column 2 ≤ j ≤ c+1 in M , there are exactly two rows in M which have nonzero support on j and they both belong to the same authorized set. For a vector v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) ∈ F n q , we refer to the support of v as the set of coordinates for which v i = 0.
In the quantum secret sharing scheme due to Smith [10] the encoded state is given by
where we assume that the u = (s, s 1 . . . , s c ) ∈ F c+1 q . Please note that we do not need to use any additional random variables in the quantum secret sharing schemes as opposed to the classical schemes. We also note that the construction in [10] will hold for span matrices that are not in normal form; however, the associated access structure must still be self-dual. The reader might find it helpful to refer to a small example given in the appendix.
We denote the von Neumann entropy of a quantum state with the density matrix ρ by S(ρ) = − Tr(ρ log 2 ρ). The following relation on the entropies of the authorized and unauthorized sets of a quantum secret sharing scheme realized by monotone span programs was shown in [14, Lemma 17] . 
III. ENTROPIC INEQUALITIES
In this section we prove our main result for monotonicity of entropy for the unauthorized sets of a quantum secret sharing scheme realized via the construction given in the previous section. We need the following lemma. Proof. Since A i is authorized, ε 1 is in im(M t Ai ) and there exists some linear combination of the rows of M Ai such that
where R j are the rows of M Ai . Without loss of generality let R 1 be the row associated with p in M {Ai} . Sincē A\{p} = B is still an authorized set, ε 1 is also in im(M t B ) and there exists a linear combination of rows in B such that
Next, we show that R 1 is independent in M A ′ . Assume that on the contrary that R 1 can also be expressed as a linear combination of the rows in M A ′ (excluding R 1 ). Now observe that the rows corresponding to A i are of two types: either they have a single non-zero element or they have 1 + |A i | nonzero elements. Permuting if necessary we can assume that R 1 is of the form f = (0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ F c+1 q or g = (1, −1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ F c+1 q . A necessary condition for R 1 be a linear combination of rows of M A ′ is that the support of these rows must contain the support of R 1 . Keeping in mind that A i \ {p} ⊆ B =Ā ′ , we infer that if R 1 = f , then no row in M A ′ has overlap with the support of R 1 . If R 1 = g, then some rows of M A ′ can have support in the first coordinate but not in the next |A i |−1 coordinates, where R 1 is nonzero. Therefore it must be the case that R 1 is independent in M A ′ . This proves the first part of the lemma. Now let us consider the case when A i ⊆Ā. If R 1 = g, then whether it is in MĀ or M A ′ , the rows inĀ do not contain the support of R 1 and similarly the rows in M A ′ do not contain the support of R 1 . Hence it is independent in both MĀ and M A ′ . If R 1 = f , then g corresponds to some other participant p ′ who is in eitherĀ or A ′ but not both as A ′ ∩Ā = {p}. Thus g is in one of the rows of M A ′ or MĀ but not both. Consequently, R 1 is independent in one of M A ′ or MĀ.
Suppose that both R 1 and g are in the same set S, where S is either A ′ orĀ. Note that A i ⊆Ā and neither is A i ⊆ A ′ because A ′ ∈ Γ. It follows that M {Ai} must contain other rows and the support of g extends beyond the support of R 1 and the first coordinate. Then since g is the only element whose support overlaps with R 1 , any linear combination of rows that generates R 1 must include g. We could rewrite this linear combination to express g as a linear combination of the elements of S. But we have already seen that g is linearly independent in both the sets A ′ andĀ. Therefore, it follows that such a combination does not exist and R 1 is independent as well. This proves the second part of the lemma.
With this preparation we are now ready to prove our central result.
Theorem 1.
Suppose that an access structure Γ is realized using the normal form monotone span construction. Let A ⊆ B ⊆ P .Then
Proof. Let us first show this result assuming that Γ is a self-dual access structure. The proof relies on Lemma 1. Without loss of generality we can assume that |B \A| = 1 structure Γ min = {{1, 2}, {2, 3}, {3, 1}}. The span matrix M for this access structure is given by
The function ψ : {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} → P , takes the values ψ(1) = 1, ψ(2) = 2, ψ(3) = 1, ψ(4) = 3, ψ(5) = 3 and ψ(6) = 1. Following equation (5), we find that the encoding (up to normalization) for the quantum secret sharing scheme is given by
Then by Theorem 1 and Lemma 1 we compute the entropy for the unauthorized sets {{∅}, {1}} is 0, log 2 q respetively, while for the authorized sets {{1, 2}, {1, 2, 3}} it is S(S) + log 2 q and S(S), where S(S) is the entropy of the secret.
In general, for self-dual access structures, if we start with the empty set and keep adding participants the entropy first increases until it becomes a minimal authorized set and then starts decreasing until it reaches S(S), giving a "tent-like" characteristic. More precisely consider the following chain of sets ∅ = B 0 B 1 · · · B n−1 B n = P , such that |B i \ B i−1 | = 1. Then only one of these sets is a minimal authorized set, say B j . If we now plot the entropy of these subsets we typically get a plot similar to the figure shown below, with S(B 0 ) = 0 and S(B n ) = S(S) and the entropy peaking at the minimal authorized set B j . (Please note that the figure below is only representative and does not correspond to any quantum access structure. For simplicity, we assume that the secret is a completely mixed state; thus S(S) = log 2 q.) S(B i )/ S(S)
The mixed-state schemes, i.e. those realizing non-selfdual access structures, also show a similar but not exactly the same "tent-like" behavior in that S(B n ) ≥ S(S).
